FMV Opinions, Inc. v. The Fair Market Valuation experts

WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center

ADMINISTRATIVE PANEL DECISION

FMV Opinions, Inc. v. the Fair Market Valuation experts

Case No. D2002-0372

1. The Parties

The complainant is FMV Opinions, Inc., a California corporation, with its

principal place of business at 4199 Campus Drive, Suite 210,

Irvine, California 92612, United States of America ("the Complainant").

The Complainant is represented by Charles C. Fowler of Lyon & Lyon,

LLP of 1900 Main Street, Sixth Floor, Irvine, California

92614, United States of America.

The respondent is identified as the business "the Fair Market Valuation

experts" having a postal address of P.O. Box 795923, Dallas,

Texas 75379-5923, United States of America ("the Respondent").

2. The Domain Name and Registrar

The disputed domain name is <fmv.com> (the "Disputed Domain

Name"), registered with Tucows, Inc., 96 Mowat Avenue, Toronto,

Ontario, Canada M6K M31 ("Registrar").

3. Procedural History

Complainant filed a complaint ( "the Complaint") with the World

Intellectual Property Organization Arbitration and Mediation Center ("the

Center") on April 20, 2002.

The Center verified that the Complaint satisfied the formal requirements

of the ICANN Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the "Uniform

Policy"), the ICANN Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution

Policy ("the Uniform Rules"), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules

for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy ("the Supplemental

Rules").

A request for Registrar verification was issued by the Center to the Registrar

on April 23, 2002, and a response by the Registrar was received

by the Center on April 23, 2002.

A notification of Complaint and commencement of administrative proceeding

(the "Commencement Notification") was communicated by the Center

to the Respondent by e-mail, and post mail on April 24, 2002.

The Panel has seen the post mail receipt and is satisfied that the delivery

of the Commencement Notification is in conformity with the relevant requirements

under Paragraph 2 and Paragraph 4 of the Uniform Rules and the relevant

provisions of the Supplemental Rules.

No response was received by the Center from Respondent on or before May 14, 2002,

which was the last day for Respondent to submit a response under Paragraph

5 of the Uniform Rules and the relevant provisions of the Commencement Notification.

A notification of Respondent’s default (the "Default Notification")

was communicated by the Center to Respondent by email and post mail on May 16, 2002.

The Panel is satisfied that the Default Notification was effectively delivered

to Respondent as required by relevant provisions of the Uniform Rules and

the Supplemental Rules.

Complainant has elected to designate a single-member Administrative Panel

in accordance with Paragraph 3(b)(iv) of the Uniform Rules. By failing to

submit a response on time, Respondent waived the right to designate a three-member

Administrative Panel under Paragraph 5(b)(iv) of the Uniform Rules. Based

on a Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence,

duly signed by the Panelist and dated May 22, 2002, the Administrative

Panel (the "Panel") was duly appointed by the Center on May 23, 2002.

A notification of appointment of administrative panel and projected decision

date was communicated by the Center to both Complainant and Respondent on

May 23, 2002. There have been no further submissions thereafter.

4. Factual Background

Under Paragraph 5(e) of the Uniform Rules, "[i]f a Respondent does

not submit a response, in the absence of exceptional circumstances, the

Panel shall decide the dispute based on the complaint."

Since Respondent failed to submit a response before the date of this decision,

the Panel adopts here the following asserted facts in the Complaint as undisputed

facts, and decides the dispute between Complainant and Respondent based

on the following undisputed facts:

(i) Complainant is the owner of common law trademark and service mark

rights in the FMV mark ("Mark"), which it has used for over

ten years. Complainant uses the Mark in connection with its business and

real estate valuation and other services, and in connection with its publications.

(ii) Complainant registered and owns the following service mark registration:

United States Service mark Registration No. 2,325,841, issued March 7, 2000,

for the mark FMV in stylized letters for "financial valuation of

personal property and real estate; fiscal assessment and evaluation of

businesses," in International Class 36, with a first use in commerce

date of January 2, 1991.

(iii) Respondent registered the Disputed Domain Name on February 8, 2000,

and is listed on the registration as the Fair Market Valuation experts,

no individual contact is identified. Respondent does not provide a telephone

number or fax number.

(iv) Complainant attempted to contact Respondent to obtain a transfer

of the Disputed Domain Names and to have Respondent cease any use of Complainant’s

protected Mark. Respondent did not respond to the letter.

5. Parties’ Contentions

Complainant asserts:

(i) The Disputed Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant’s

name and registered service mark. Complainant’s service mark registration issued

on March 7, 2000, from an application filed on November 23, 1998,

and was first used in commerce at least as early as January, 1991. Although

the registration is for the stylized design shown in the registration, the word

portion of the Mark is predominant. Prior panels have routinely found identity

or confusing similarity between domain names and trademarks incorporating stylized

forms or designs. (See, e.g., CBS Broadcasting, Inc. v. Worldwide Webs,

Inc., WIPO Case No. D2000-0834

(Sept. 4, 2000); The Marigny Corporation v. Discount Coffee.com,

Inc., WIPO Case No. D2001-0354 (May 17, 2001);

WestJet Air Center, Inc. v. West Jets LLC, NAF CaseNo. FA0103000096883 (April 25, 2001)).

Complainant has earlier common law rights in the FMV trademark and service

mark, by virtue of the inherently distinctive character of the Mark, and of

its early use of the Mark. Common law rights are sufficient in order to invoke

the Uniform Policy. (See, e.g., MatchNet plc v. MAC Trading, WIPO

Case No. D2000-0205 (May 11, 2000)). Therefore, it is beyond dispute

that in addition to its federal registration, Complainant owns state and federal

common law rights in the Mark.

Complainant’s Mark is inherently distinctive (i.e., non-descriptive)

in the sense that it does not "define qualities or characteristics

of [the goods or services] in a straightforward way that requires no exercise

of the imagination to be understood." Kendall-Jackson Winery v.

E & J Gallo Winery, 150 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir. 1998).

The term FMV has no descriptive meaning, rather it is arbitrary, having

no relevance to any feature or characteristic of the associated goods

or services, id., or, at most, suggestive of those goods or services.

Complainant’s rights in the Mark were created at least as early as January, 1991,

when it began using the Mark in association with its business and financial

valuation services and it has continuously used the Mark from the time

those rights were created. Complainant has also invested considerable

time, effort, and at least $1.1 million in advertising and publicizing

its Mark since 1991. Even if Complainant’s Mark was found to be descriptive,

by virtue of its extensive use of the Mark for more than ten years, the

Mark has generated substantial secondary meaning, rendering it distinctive

and subject to protection.

Respondent’s Disputed Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to Complainant’s

Mark. In making this analysis, it is proper to disregard the ".com"

portion of the domain name and the mark as "an irrelevant distinction which

does not change the likelihood of confusion." Microsoft Corporation

v. Amit Mehrota, WIPO Case No. D2000-0053

(April 10, 2000). This leaves only the identity between the Disputed

Domain Name and its Mark, at minimum, confusingly similar to Complainant’s registered

service mark.

(ii) Respondent does not demonstrate any legitimate interests in the

Disputed Domain Name. Respondent does not have any intellectual property

or other rights in the Disputed Domain Name, nor is Respondent using it

in a manner consistent with any legitimate interests.

Respondent has constructed a mock-up web page stating that "We are currently

in development." The web page is clearly pretextual and falls short of

demonstrating any preparations to use the domain name in connection with a bona

fide offering of goods or services as required by the Uniform Policy. Respondent

registered the Disputed Domain Name more than two years ago and has yet to develop

the site in any way. The fact that a site was still "under construction"

or "under development" more than one year since registering the domain

name was strong evidence of lack of legitimate interests and would not satisfy

the Uniform Policy. (See, e.g., Banque Bruxelles Lambert S.A. and One Two

Trade S.A. v. AIB and M123 Multimedia Inc., WIPO

Case No. D2000-1818 (March 13, 2001); Sydney Markets Limited

v. Nick Rakis trading as Shell Information Systems, WIPO

Case No. D2001-0932 (October 8, 2001)).

Respondent has provided a click-through advertisement on its Disputed

Domain Name website, which users are diverted to another website, http://www.sell.com,

which various goods and services are offered for sale in an "online

classifieds" style. The diversion is not direct and the user is diverted

by way of another site, http://www.stride.com. The <stride.com>

domain name is registered to an entity at the same Post Office Box as

Respondent. That same Post Office Box is also the address for another

domain name registrant, <apparelmart.com> which has a website constructed

very similar to Respondent’s with a click-through link to <sell.com.>

Respondent has constructed at least two websites for the purpose of improperly

diverting users through click-through advertising to the <sell.com> website.

These arrangements typically provide revenues to the diverting website owner,

through fees paid by the destination website, which is <sell.com.> These

arrangements have been consistently held not to constitute rights or legitimate

interests under the Uniform Policy. (See, e.g., Park Place Entertainment

Corporation v. Bowno, WIPO Case No. D2001-1410

(January 29, 2001); Royal Bank of Canada v. Personal, WIPO

Case No. D2001-0761 (July 24, 2001)). Even in the absence of a

fee paid by <sell.com,> Respondent’s use of Complainant’s Mark to divert

users from the Disputed Domain Name to <sell.com> cannot constitute a

legitimate use of the Disputed Domain Name. (See Chanel, Inc. v. Estco Technology

Group, WIPO Case No. D2000-0413 (September 18, 2000)

(to be a "legitimate use" of a protected mark under the Policy, the

use must be non-infringing).

Finally, Complainant believes that Respondent was never commonly known

by the Disputed Domain Name, therefore Respondent does not have a right

or legitimate interest in the Disputed Domain Name under paragraph 4(c)(ii)

of the Uniform Policy.

(iii) The Disputed Domain Name has been registered and is used by Respondent

in bad faith. Respondent registered the Disputed Domain name for the sole purpose

of attracting and diverting consumers, for commercial gain, to the <sell.com>

website. These actions create a likelihood of confusion with Complainant’s Mark

as to the source or sponsorship of the Disputed Domain Name, in direct contravention

of Paragraph 4(b)(iv) of the Uniform Policy. (See, e.g., Pfizer, Inc.

v. Seocho and Vladimir Snezko, WIPO Case

No. D2001-1199 (November 28, 2001)).

The difficulty in determining the identity of the real party in interest is

a fact common to several cases in which bad faith has been found. The Respondent

is not a business that is registered with the Texas Secretary of State. In addition,

no less than three separate domain name registrants list the same Post Office

Box as Respondent. Moreover, the actual owner of the listed Post Office Box,

according to the United States Post Office in Dallas, Texas, is yet another

business, Emphasys Technology. None of the domain name registrations, including

the registration for the Disputed Domain Name list a telephone or fax number

by which the registrant may be contacted, nor do any of them include a named

individual as a contact. The Respondent has made itself very difficult to locate

and did not respond to the cease and desist letter sent by Complainant. These

actions have consistently been held to constitute bad faith under the Uniform

Policy. (See Park Place Entertainment Corporation v. Bowno (providing

erroneous and incomplete contact information constitutes bad faith); Minnesota

Mining & Manufacturing v. JonLR, WIPO

Case No. D2001-0428 (May 30, 2001) (failure to respond to cease

and desist letter)).

Finally, by registering the Disputed Domain Name and using the associated

website in the manner it has, Respondent has disrupted the business of

Complainant, in part by preventing Complainant from reflecting its mark

in a corresponding domain name. Complainant has not obtained evidence

of a pattern of such conduct on the part of Respondent, in part because

Complainant cannot determine the real party behind Respondent to determine

the extent of its domain name registration activities.

Nevertheless, Complainant submits that the impact of Respondent’s actions

on Complainant’s business should be considered in determining Respondent’s

bad faith. Respondent registered the Disputed Domain Name for no legitimate

purpose, but instead to trade on Complainant’s goodwill by diverting consumers

to another commercial site. Respondent, whoever it may be, has operated

out of a Post Office Box shared by several other entities, the relationships

between which are all too unclear. Respondent refuses to respond to Complainant’s

request to cease using its infringing domain name, and offers no justification

for its continued use. On these facts, Respondent’s bad faith is evident.

Pursuant to Paragraph 5(e) of the Uniform Rules, in the absence of a Response

from the Respondent, "the Panel shall decide the dispute based on the

complaint." The Panel will independently determine the merits of the

Complaint on the basis of all evidence available.

6. Discussion and Findings

(i) The Disputed Domain Name is identical to the trademark in which

Complainant has rights.

The Disputed Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar in its functional

part to Complainant’s registered service mark. Although Complainant’s registration

is for the stylized design shown in the registration, prior Panels have held

that since domain names are limited to text and do not include any graphical

element, any stylized mark that is to serve as the basis of a domain name must

be reduced to a textual form. (See e.g., Playboy Enterprises International,

Inc. v. Hector Rodriguez, WIPO Case No.

D2000-1016 (November 8, 2000); Surface Protection Industries,

Inc. v. The Webposters a/k/a Mark’s Paint Store, Inc., WIPO

Case No. D2000-1613 (February 5, 2001)). Even apart from the inherent

rights in Complainant’s service mark registration, the Complainant owns common

law rights in the word mark "fmv." Paragraph 4(a) of the Uniform Policy

does not limit its reach to registered marks only. It has now become a well-established

principle, through numerous panel decisions, that the Uniform Policy encompasses

unregistered common law marks that are established pursuant to national and/or

state law that governs the recognition of those marks. Park Place Entertainment

Corporation v. Bowno (holding such marks are indeed recognized and subject to

protection under § 43 of the Lanham Act).

The Panel does not consider whether Complainant’s service mark is inherently

distinctive and may have developed a secondary meaning, rendering it distinctive

and subject to protection, as the Panel finds it unnecessary to consider

this analysis. "All that is necessary is that the domain name misappropriate

sufficient textual components from the mark such that an ordinary Internet

user who is familiar with the goods or services … likely think … that an

affiliation exists between the site identified by that domain name and the

owner or licensed user of the mark." Playboy Enterprises International,

Inc. v. Hector Rodriguez.

The Panel finds that Complainant has proved that the Disputed Domain Name

is confusingly similar to Complainant’s Mark under Paragraph 4(a)(i) of

the Uniform Policy.

(ii) Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of

the Disputed Domain Name.

Under Paragraph 4(c) of the Uniform Policy, legitimate interests in a domain

name may be demonstrated by showing that: (i) before any notice of the dispute,

respondent used, or demonstrably prepared to use, the domain name or a name

corresponding to the domain name in connection with a bona fide offering

of goods or services; (ii) respondent has been commonly known by the domain

name, even if no trademark or service mark rights have been acquired; or

(iii) respondent is making a legitimate noncommercial or fair use of the

domain name, without intent for commercial gain to misleadingly divert customers

or to tarnish the trademark or service mark at issue.

Except for having registered and maintained the Disputed Domain Name and operating

an associated website with a message stating that the site is "currently

in development," the only other use undertaken by Respondent appears to

be the use of a click-through advertisement stating "[C]urrently working

in cooperation with: sell.com," where "sell.com" is a hypertext

link to the <sell.com> website. "A mock up prototype website

is not adequate evidence to show that the Respondent has used, or made demonstrable

preparations to use, the contested domain name in connection with a bona fide

offering of goods and services, or that the Respondent is making a legitimate

noncommercial or fair use of the contested domain name." Sydney Markets

Limited v. Nick Rakis trading as Shell Information Systems, WIPO

Case No. D2001-0932 (October 8, 2001). Hence, the issue is whether

the click-through advertisement to the <sell.com> website changes the

situation.

Complainant asserts that Respondent’s provision of a click-through advertisement

is not a legitimate use of the Disputed Domain Name. Given the fact that

there is no clear connection between Respondent’s website and the <sell.com>

site, and that Respondent’s site has remained under construction for approximately

two years (the Panel notes that the copyright notice on the <fmv.com>

site is dated 2001) leads the Panel to conclude that the <fmv.com>

site is merely being used to divert users to the <sell.com> site.

While there is no evidence to suggest whether this is a paid arrangement

between Respondent and the owner/operator of <sell.com>, the operation

of a website for the limited purpose of diverting users to another site,

absent any other evidence, is not a legitimate use of the Disputed Domain

Name under the Uniform Policy.

There is no evidence that Respondent has been commonly known by the Disputed

Domain Name. The Complainant has never licensed or otherwise permitted the

Respondent to use any of its Marks, nor does the Complainant have any relationship

or association with the Respondent.

There is also no evidence that Respondent is making or intends to make a legitimate

non-commercial or fair use of the Disputed Domain Name without intent for commercial

gain to misleadingly divert consumers or to tarnish Complainant’s trademark.

Where it appears Respondent has no connection with the Disputed Domain Name,

apart from having registered it, and where the Disputed Domain Name has been

dormant for a significant period of time (2 years), the burden of proof shifts

to the Respondent to demonstrate that such a right or legitimate interest does

exist. Clerical Medical Investment Group Limited v. Clericalmedical.com,

WIPO Case No. D2000-1228 (November 28,

2000). Respondent has not filed a formal response to this Complaint asserting

a legitimate interest in the Disputed Domain Name. Consequently, there isn’t

any evidence demonstrating any cognizable rights or legitimate interests the

Respondent may have in the Disputed Domain Name.

Based on the above, the Panel concludes that Respondent fails the tests

set out in Paragraph 4(c)(i),(ii), and (iii) of the Uniform Policy and cannot

claim rights or legitimate interests in the Disputed Domain Name thereunder.

(iii) The Disputed Domain Name has been registered and is being used

in bad faith.

Paragraph 4(b) of the Uniform Policy states "the following circumstances,

in particular but without limitation, … shall be evidence of the registration

and used of a domain name in bad faith:" (i) the domain name has been

registered or acquired by a respondent primarily for the purpose of selling,

renting, or otherwise transferring the domain name registration to the complainant

who is the owner of the mark or a competitor of complainant, for valuable

consideration is excess of respondent’s out-of-pocket costs; (ii) respondent

registered the domain name in order to prevent the owner of the mark from

reflecting the mark in a corresponding domain name, provided that the respondent

has engaged in a pattern of such conduct; or (iii) by using the domain name,

respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain,

Internet users to its website by creating a likelihood of confusion with

the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement

of respondent’s website or location.

The Panel finds tenable Complainant’s contention that under Paragraph 4(b)(iv)

of the Uniform Policy, Respondent has "intentionally attempted to attract,

for commercial gain, Internet users … by creating a likelihood of confusion

with the complainant’s mark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement"

through use of the Disputed Domain Name in association with text proclaiming

Respondent to be an "online Fair Market Valuation Expert." Complainant

has also established that Respondent has engaged in commercial exploitation

of the Disputed Domain Name by providing a click-through advertisement on its

website, to the <sell.com> website, which offers various goods and services

for sale. Respondent’s website states that it is "currently working in

cooperation with" <sell.com>. While no direct conclusion can be drawn

from Respondent’s failure to provide some type of explanation, in some circumstances,

a negative inference can be drawn from the lack of justification by the Respondent,

especially when evidence submitted by Complainant points in the direction of

Respondent not having any rights or legitimate interests in the Disputed Domain

Name. (See Banque Bruxelles Lambert S.A. and One Two Trade S.A. v. AIB and

M123 Multimedia Inc., WIPO Case No. D2000-1818

(March 13, 2001)).

It does not matter under the Uniform Policy how much or little money a party

makes from the commercial use of a domain name. The controlling factor is whether

or not the Respondent’s website is commercial." National Association

for Stock Car Auto Racing, Inc. v. Steven R. Shacklette, WIPO

Case No. D2001-1350 (February 4, 2002). The likelihood is that

Respondent attracted a fee for the redirection of traffic or Respondent is itself

the operator of the <sell.com> site, in which case it benefits directly

from the redirection. Such arrangements are common and no other reasons for

the redirection are readily apparent. Royal Bankof Canada v. Personal,

WIPO Case No. D2001-0761 (July 24, 2001).

"Both case law and prior arbitral findings have held that misdirecting

or redirecting Internet users can constitute bad faith." Geocities v.

Geociites.com, WIPO Case No. D2000-0326

(June 19, 2000). Respondent also appears to own at least two other

domain names, <stride.com> and <apparelmart.com,> which also link

to the <sell.com> website.

Respondent has furnished incomplete contact information to the Registrar, which

constitutes a breach of the registration agreement, which can be taken as evidence

of bad faith. (See, e.g. Women in Military Service for America Memorial Foundation,

Inc. v. Russian Web Marketing, WIPO Case

No. D2001-0610 (July 11, 2001); Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.

v. [No Name], WIPO Case No. D2000-0515

(September 13, 2000)). "An obligation exists on each domain name

registrant, under its registration agreement, to not only provide its registrar

with current, complete and accurate contact information but also to update that

information to reflect any subsequent changes in order that the information,

accessible through the WhoIs database, is always current, complete and accurate."

Park Place Entertainment Corporation v. Bowno (holding that Panels view

erroneous contact information as a deliberate, continuing attempt calculated

to conceal that registrant’s identity and location, and thereby frustrate service

of process and obstruct the application of the Uniform Policy).

Complainant contends that under Paragraph 4(b)(iii) of the Uniform Policy,

Respondent has disrupted the business of Complainant, in part by preventing

Complainant from reflecting its service mark in a corresponding domain name,

although Complainant has not obtained evidence that Respondent has a pattern

of such conduct. Complainant has not been able to produce such evidence

because Complainant has been unable to determine the real party behind Respondent

to determine the extent of its domain name registration activities.

While the Panel also has been unable to determine the real party behind Respondent,

it has found evidence that Respondent may have been involved in at least two

other WIPO administrative proceedings (See, e.g., VAT Holding AG v. Vat.com,

WIPO Case No. D2000-0607 (August 22, 2000);

AKG Acoustics GmbH v. Allen G., WIPO

Case No. D2001-0533 (July 2, 2001). In the VAT Holding AG v.

Vat.com proceeding, in which the Respondent prevailed, the website associated

with the <vat.com> stated that it was "coming soon" and provided

a link to the <sell.com> website. Although the <vat.com> site currently

displays some information about value added taxes, it continues to claim it

is "coming soon," almost two years later, and continues to redirect

visitors to <sell.com>. The Respondent in the VAT Holding AG v. Vat.com

decision was called eMphasys Technologies Inc. ("eMphasys") of the

same address as Respondent in this administrative proceeding. Complainant has

indicated that Respondent’s P.O. Box in Texas is assigned to "Emphasys

Technologies." eMphasys specializes in web hosting, email services, web

design and branding, and database backed websites. At least 26 clients are listed

on eMphasys website including <sell.com> and <stride.com>. Without

additional information from Respondent, the Panel finds it reasonable to conclude

that eMphasys and Respondent are one in the same.

The Panel finds the facts in the VAT Holding AG case distinguishable from

the facts in the present case primarily because of the <vat.com> site’s

provision of information about value added taxes. The <fmv.com> site

provides no useful information. In the AKG Acoustices GmbH v. Allen G.

proceeding, the Respondent is listed as Allen G. of the same address as

Respondent in this administrative proceeding. The Respondent in this case

failed to respond to the Complaint and the Panel found for the Complainant.

From this evidence, the Panel finds it plausible that under Paragraph 4(b)(ii)

of the Uniform Policy, Respondent has registered the Disputed Domain Name

in order to prevent Complainant from reflecting its Mark in a corresponding

domain name, and the Respondent has engaged in a pattern of such conduct.

Absent any explanation from Respondent to refute the evidence submitted

by the Complainant and found by the Panel, the Panel finds evidence of bad

faith, including Respondent trading on Complainant’s goodwill by diverting

Internet users to another commercial site, Respondent’s registration of

the domain name in order to prevent Complainant from doing so, Respondent’s

provision of erroneous contact information, and Respondent’s failure to

respond to the Complainant’s cease and desist letter or to file any response

in these administrative proceedings.

The Panel therefore finds that Complainant has proved Respondent’s bad

faith in registering and using the Disputed Domain Name under Paragraph

4(b)(ii) and (iv) of the Uniform Policy.

7. Decision

In light of the foregoing, the Panel hereby determines that the Disputed

Domain Name is identical or confusingly similar to the trademark of Complainant,

that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the

Disputed Domain Name, and that the Disputed Domain Name has been registered

and is being used by Respondent in bad faith.

Accordingly, pursuant to Paragraph 4(i) of the Uniform Policy, the Panel

hereby orders that the Disputed Domain Name <fmv.com> be transferred

to Complainant.

Timothy D. Casey

Sole Panelist

Dated: June 10, 2002